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CHAPTER 8 
Contracts and Commercial Law 
DONNA M. SHERRY0 
§8.1. Introduction. Although most of the contract and commercial 
law cases decided in the appellate courts of the Commonwealth during 
the Survey year were unremarkable, the employer-employee relationship 
absorbed much of the Supreme Judicial Court's attention. Undoubt-
edly, at least one of its decisions 1 in this area will attract much com-
mentary in legal joumals. This chapter summarizes the more note-
worthy cases arising out of the Court's focus on the employer-employee 
relationship,2 a case of a more general contract law nature,3 and a 
decision adding to the interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code.4 
§o.2. Employment Contract'>: Employer's Implied Covenant of Good 
Faith. In a significant decision, Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,l 
the Supreme Judicial Court held that an employment contract termin-
able at will contains an implied covenant of good faith. 
Fortune, a salesman for National Cash Register Company ("NCR") 
for almost twenty-five years, was employed under a written contract 
terminable at will, without cause, by either party.2 The contract 
provided that Fortune would receive a weekly salary plus a bonus 
0 DONNA ~[. SHERRY practices law with the fim1 of Gaston Snow & Ely 
Bartlett, Boston. 
§8.1. 1 Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1569, 364 
N.E.2d 1251. See § 8.2 infra. 
2 Other cases, not discussed in this chapter but which may be of interest, arc 
Balkin v. Frank M. Katz, Inc., .371 .\lass. 900, 367 N.E.2d 628 (1977) (holding 
that the employee's continued employment for six years after the employer alleg-
edly promised a pension was sufficient evidence of consideration to allow the case 
to go to the jury); Dickson v. Riverside Iron Works, Inc., 1978 Mass. App. Ct. 
Adv. Sh. 114, 372 N.E.2d 1302 (employer breached contract by terminating em-
ployee for a reason not within termination provision of employment contract for a 
certain term ) . 
3 Harness Tracks Security, Inc. v. Bay State Raceway, Inc., 1978 ~lass. Adv. 
Sh. 309, 373 N.E.2d 353. See § 8.5 infra. 
4 E.H. Hinds, Inc. v. Coolidge Bank & Trust Co., 1978 ~lass. App. Ct. Adv. 
Sh. 15, 372 N.E.2d 259. See § 8.6 infra. 
§8.2. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1569, 364 N.E.2d 1251. 
2 Id. at 1570, 364 N.E.2d at 1253. 
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i 
commission for all sales NCR made within his "gu~ranteed territory." 
The amount of the bonus was determined by "bonus credits," which 
were computed as a percentage of the price of the products sold.3 
Fortune would be paid seventy-five per cent of the bonus credit if the 
territory was assigned to him at the time of the order, with the re-
maining twenty-five per cent to be paid if the territory was assigned 
to him at the date of delivery and installation of the ordered equip-
ment.4 The contract further provided that Fortune's b~nus interest would 
terminate if an order did not ship within eighteen m~pths from the date 
of the order, unless special engineering was require~~o fulfill the c. on-
tract or unless the territory was still assigned to rju at the date of 
delivery and installation!' 
In 1968, when NCR introduced a new model cash I register, Fortune's 
territory included First National Stores, which had 1 been his account 
for the previous six years and which had placed sevtfal orders through 
Fortune during this period. Fortune corresponded with First National 
in an effort to sell the new cash register and helped arrange a demon-
stration of it to First National executives. Following receipt of a letter 
from NCR managers covering such items as price pr~tection and trade-
ins, First National signed an order for approximate! $5,000,000 worth 
of the new cash registers on November 29, 1968, wi h delivery spread 
out over a four-year period.n Although Fortune's superiors had negoti-
ated the terms of the order, Fortune's name was listed on the order 
form as "salesman credited" for a bonus credit of $~2,079.99.7 
On January 6, 1969, Fortune received a termination potice from NCR.8 
He discussed the matter with his manager, who first confirmed For-
tune's dismissal, but then "consider[ed] some of the details necessary 
for the smooth operation of the First National order" and told Fortune 
to stay with the company.11 Fortune remained withl· NCR in a "sales 
support" position, coordinating delivery of the cash registers to First 
National as well as servicing other accounts.10 Eighteen months after 
receiving the first termination notice, Fortune, then sixty-two years old, 
3 Fortune's territory included customer accounts or stor s assigned him for 
"coverage or supervision." By this arrangement, Fortune ould be entitled to 
the bonus on sales within his territory whether or not he himself made the sale. Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1570-71, 364 N.E.2d at 1253. 
6 Id. at 1571-72, 364 N.E.2d at 1253-54. ! 
7 Id. at 1572, 364 N.E.2d at 1254. i 
8 The termination notice was dated December 2, 1968 ahd was addressed to 
Fortune's home, but it was not seen by him until he discovJred the envelope on 
his desk at NCR on January 6, 1969. Id. at 1572, 364 N.E.2d at 1254. 
9 Id. 
lo Id, 
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was asked to retire. When he refused, he was then fired in June of 
1970. He had received seventy-five percent of the applicable bonus 
due on the cash registers theretofore delivered to First National and 
installed, but his request for the additional ~enty-five percent was 
refused. Fortune received no bonus payments on cash registers de-· 
livered to First National after June of 1970.11 
Fortune brought suit in superior court against his former employer 
to recover the remainder of the bonus commission claimed due for the 
cash registers. He claimed both under the written employment con-
tract and in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of his services 
relating to the First National sale. At the close of the plaintiff's case, 
NCR moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that there was no 
evidence of any breach of contract and that the existence of a contract 
barred recovery under quantum meruit. The trial judge ruled that 
Fortune could recover if the termination and firing were in bad faith, 
and these issues were, by agreement of counsel, submitted to the jury 
by request for special verdicts.12 The jury found both the contract 
termination and the firing to have been done in bad faith, and judgment 
was entered for the plaintiff in a stipulated amountP The Appeals 
Court reversed 14 and the Supreme Judicial Court granted further ap-
pellate review.16 
The Court framed the central question on appeal as whether this 
"bad faith" termination constituted a breach of the employment at will 
contract,l0 The Court cited the rule widely followed, although uni-
n Id. at 1572-73, 364 N.E.2d at 1254-55. 
12 The two submitted questions were: 
l. Did the Defendant act in bad faith . . . when it decided to terminate 
the Plaintiff's contract as a salesman by letter dated December 2, 1968, delivered 
on January 6, 1969? 
2. Did the Defendant act in bad faith ... when the defendant let the 
Plaintiff go on June 5, 1970? 
1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1574, 364 N.E.2d at 1255. 
13 This amount was $45,649.62, representing twenty-five percent of the bonus 
commission due while Fortune was still employed by NCR, and one hundred per-
cent of the commissions on the machines delivered after Fortune was fired. Id. at 
1574, 1574 n.6, 364 N.E.2d 1255, 1255 n.6. The Court expressly reserved the 
question of whether other measures or damages may be justified in bad faith ter-
mination cases. Id. at 1575 n.7, 364 N.E.2d at 1255 n.7. 
14 4 Mass .. App. 386, 349 N.E.2d 350 ( 1976). 
15 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1569, 364 N.E.2d at 1253. 
w Id. at 1574, 364 N.E.2d at 1255. NCR raised a number of other arguments, 
but these were apparently deemed peripheral by the Court: 1) No evidence of 
bad faith: the Court remarked that the evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, supported a jury verdict that termination of Fortune's twenty-five years 
of employment as a salesman the next business day after NCR received a $5,000,000 
order was motivated by a desire to pay Fortune as little of the bonus credit as it 
could; id. at 1580, 364 N.E.2d at 1258; 2) The firing was beyond bonus credit 
3
Sherry: Chapter 8: Contracts and Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1978
154 1978 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §8.2 
formly criticized,!' that employment at will contracts may be terminated 
by either side without reason.18 The Court further njed that the con-
tract at issue reserved to the parties that explicit po er, and that For-
tune had received all the bonus commissions to whic he was entitled 
under the express terms of the contract.1 n Thus, the Court concluded 
that under a literal reading of the contract NCR [d committed no 
breach and, therefore, had no further liability to Fortu e.~ 0 Nonetheless, 
the Court held that NCR's written contract contained an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, and that a termin tion not made in 
good faith will constitute a breach of contract.21 
In reaching its holding, the Court observed that it was "merely recog-
nizing the general requirement in this Commonwealth that parties to 
contracts and commercial transactions must act in ~od faith toward 
one another." :!Z The Court then cited a number of assachusetts cases 
in which a requirement of good faith has been assu ed or implied in 
a variety of contractual contexts.23 The Court the stated: "Recent 
period: the Court observed that the jury could have found ortunc was stripped 
of his "salesman" designation to disqualify him for the remai ing twenty-five per-
cent of the First National commission; similarly, he may have been fired in June 
of 1970 to avoid paying him any commissions after that date; id. at 1580-81, 364 
N.E.2d at 1258; 3) Fortune failed to follow the notice and grievance procedure 
set forth in the contract: the Court noted that these provisions were for settlement 
of disputes among salesmen and between a salesman and his branch manager, and 
were not applicable to termination grievances. Further, Fortune would have been 
excused if the fact finders drew the inference that NCR would not have com-
plied with its obligations even if it had received timely notice1 id. at 1582-83, 364 
N.E.2d at 1258-59; 4) Fortune failed to bring suit within two years after the 
cause of action accrued as required by the contract: the Court stated that the 
shorter limitation period was not raised in the answer or argu d to the trial judge, 
so the claim was not properly before the Court; id. at 1584, 364 N.E.2d at 1259 
(citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 8( c)); Kagan v. Levinson, 334 Nfass. 100, 106, 134 
N.E.2d 415, 418 ( 1956). ·r 
17 See generally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Lim-
iting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Pou.:er, 67 CoLUi\I. L. REv. 1404 ( 1967); 
Blumrosen, Workers' Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis-A 
Judge for Our Season, 24 RuTGERS L. HEv. 480 ( 1970), cited bv Fortune, 1977 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1574-75, 364 N.E.2d at 1255. -
18 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1574-75, 364 N.E.2d at 1255. 
19 Id. at 1575, 364 N.E.2d at 1255. 
~u r 
21 Id., 364 N.E.2d at 1255-56. ! 
22 Id. at 1576-77, 364 N.E.2d at 1256. The Court cited ~xamples of statutory 
good faith requirements in the Uniform Commercial Code, see .L. c. 106, § 1-203, 
and in motor vehicle franchise legislation, see Former G.L. c. 93B § 4 ( 3) (c) (now 
G.L. c. 93B, § 4(3)(e) ). 
The Court also explicitly ruled that Fortune's remedy rested on the express con· 
tract, and not on tort principles. Id. at 1576, 1576 n.S, 364 N.E.2d at 1256, 1256 
n.8. Thus, the Comt found it unnecessary to decide plaintiff's quantum meruit 
claim. Id. n.9. 
23 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1577, 364 N;E.2d at 1256 citing Druker v. Roland 
M. Jutras Assocs., 370 Mass. 383, 348 N.E.2d 763 ( 1976) (interior designer under 
I 
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decisions in other jurisdictions lend support to the proposition that good 
faith is implied in contracts terminable at will." 24 It placed particular 
emphasis on the recent New Hampshire case of Monge v. Beebe Rub-
ber Co.25 
In an attempt to narrow its holding, the Court stated that it was not 
pronouncing a broad policy that an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing exists in every contract, or even in every at will employment 
contract.2r. Rather, the Court stated, it was merely holding that where 
commissions are to be paid for work performed by the employee, the 
employer's decision to terminate its at will employee should be made 
in good faith. 2 i 
contract with plaintiff restauranteur acting in bad faith when trading on restaurant 
name and logo developed by plaintiff); Kerrigan v. Boston, 361 !\lass. 24, 278 
N.E.2d 387 (1972) (collective bargaining contract); l\Iurach v. Massachusetts 
Bonding & Ins. Co., 339 l\Iass. 184, 187, 158 N.E.2d 338 (1959) (insurance con-
tract-insurer must act in good faith when exercising discretionary power to settle 
claims); Krauss v. Kuechler, 300 Mass. 346, 15 N .E.2d 207 ( 1938) (seller bound 
by agreement to sell at price set by interested partv so long as the latter has made 
known his interest and has acted in good faith); Clarke v. State Street Trust Co., 
270 Mass. 140, 169 N.E. 897 ( 1930) (secondary agreement to a stock option 
agreement); Elliot v. Kazajian, 255 Mass. 459, 152 N.E. 351 ( 1926) (broker's 
commission); Chandler, Gardner & Williams, Inc. v. Reynolds, 250 Mass. 309, 14.5 
N.E. 476 (1924) (contracts to he performed to the satisfaction of the other party). 
See also RLl\1 Assocs. v. Carter Mfg. Corp., 356 !\lass. 718, 248 N.E.2d 646 ( 1969) 
(sales commission agreement). 
The Court noted that the instant case differed from RLM, where the defendant 
terminated the commission agreement shortly before being awarded a contract 
brought to its attention by plaintiff, thereby depriving plaintiff of any commissions. 
In Fortune, on the other hand, the plaintiff had been credited with the First Na-
tional sale and had received a portion of the commission due just prior to being 
fired. The Court, however, rejected NCR's attempt to distinguish RLM through 
its argument that bad faith is not at issue: when the employer has been careful 
to protect a portion of the employee's bonus commission in the contract. The 
defendant's motive in terminating the employment, the Court stated, remains a 
jury issue regardless of the fact that a portion of the bonus may have already 
"vested." 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1577-78, 364 N.E.2d at 1256-57. 
24 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1578, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. 
25 I d. at 1578-79, 364 N.E.2d at 1257 (quoting Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 
114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 552 (1974)). 
26 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1579, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. 
2i Id. at 1579-80, 364 N.E.2d at 1257-58. The Court applied the agency law 
principle that when the principal ends his eontractual relationship when the agent 
is on the brink of completing the sale in order to avoid paying the agent any 
compensation, or when the principal attempts to deprive the agent of any portion 
of his commission, then the principal has acted in bad faith. The ensuing trans-
action between principal and buyer will then be viewed as having been accom-
plished by the agent. See RESTATEI\IENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 454, and Com-
ment (a) ( 1958). The Court observed that this rule is fre<1uently applied to 
prevent overreaching by employers ami the forfeiture of benefits almost earned by 
the employee's rendering of substantial services. See 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1580, 
364 N.E.2d at 1257 for cases cited. 
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Although the C~urt struggled to avoid an overhroa4 pronouncement 
of the effect of its decision in Fortune,28 its impact may well he the 
establishment of a new general rule rather than a limited exception to 
the common law rule. 2n Further defining of the hound~ries of this new 
rule will most likely require several more appellate dlecisions. 
Historically, the only limitations to the common law rule that employ-
ment contracts for an indefinite period of time were t~rminable at will 
without cause or reason or for any cause or reason 30 hare been imposed 
by legislation.31 During the past two decades, however, several com-
mentators have suggested, for various reasons, limitations on the com-
mon law rule.32 Furthermore, a handful of state co4rts have carved 
I 
28 The Court also stated: 
We do not question the general principle that an employer lis entitled to be 
motivated by and to serve its own legitimate business iner¢st; that an em-
ployer must have wide latitude in deciding whom it will en1ploy in the face 
of uncertainties of the business world; and that an employer need flexibility 
in the face of changing circumstances. We recognize the employer's need for 
a large amount of control over its work force. I 
1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1576, 364 N.E.2d at 1256. 1 
29 Indeed, the Fortune decision has been characterized as "the repudiation .. 
of the rule that an employer can discharge an at-will employee for any or no 
reason." Glendon and Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Errjployment Relation·· 
ship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REv. 457, 4159 1979. 
30 In the case often cited as the classic formulation of the terminable at will 
rule, the Court stated that all employers "may dismiss their employees at will . . . 
for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wr~ng, without being 
thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne v. Western & A. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 
(1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 T nn. 527, 179 S.W. 
134 (1915). The rule in the United States dates back to the nineteenth centurv, 
first asserted in H. Wooo, MASTER Al\'D SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877), and judi-
cially incorporated in Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Yjll7, 42 N.E. 416, 
26 N.Y.S. 283 ( 1895). See Feinman, The Development of t(le Employment at 
Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HxsT. 118 ( 1976); Comment, Employment at Will and 
the Law of Contract, 23 BuFFALO L. REv. 211 ( 1973). 
31 In most collective bargaining agreements, however, eover~d employees may 
not be discharged absent good cause. Summers, Individual Pro ection Against Un-
;ust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L. REv. 481, 483, 49 (1976). Specific 
statutory reasons for which an employee may not be discharged include race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (197~); age, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(a) (1976); debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1976); membershi in a labor union, 
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976); invoking the protection of th Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215( a) ( 3) ( 1976). In addition, other federal statutes 
identify categories of employees who could not be discharged without good cause, 
including veterans returning to prior employment within ninetyJ days of discharge 
from the armed services, 38 U.S.C. § 2021 ( 1976), and civil service employees 
in the executive branch of federal government, 5 U.S.C. § 750 (a) (1976). 
32 See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the 
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1404 ( 1967); Feinman, 
supra note 30; Blumrosen, Settlement of Disputes Concerning tJie Exercise of Em-
ployer Discretionary Power: United States Report, 18 RuTGEHS L.l REv. 428 (1964); 
Summers, supra note 31; Comment, Employmeut at Will and the Law of Contracts, 
23 BuFFALO L. REv. 211 ( 1973); Note, A Commou Law Action for the Abusively 
I 
I 
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out an exception to the common law rule where the employee termina-
tion would contravene a clear expression of important public policy, 
with the public policy usually grounded upon specific legislative ac-
tion.33 In the Monge case,34 however, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court went beyond simply carving out an exception and modified the 
common law rule: "A termination by the employer of a contract for 
an employee at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based 
on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the 
public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract." 311 
. Thus, under the New Hampshire Court's reformulation of the rule, an 
at will employee may be terminated for good cause or no cause only.36 
Moreover, New Hampshire's modification of the rule is based on its 
Court's concept of the balance of the interests of the employer, the 
employee, and the public.37 
In the Fortune case, as in Monge, the public policy is based not on 
legislative direction, but on the Court's view of its role in preventing 
overreaching by employers and forfeiture by employees of benefits al-
most earned by the rendering of substantial services.38 To accomplish 
this, the Court rewrote the contract between the parties 39 to impose 
Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 1435 (1975); Note, A Personal Damage 
Remedy for the Employee at Will: A Reappraisal of a Recent Proposal, 22 S.D. 
L. REv. 431 (1977); Note, Implied Contract Rights to ]ob Security, 26 STAN. L. 
REv. 335 (1974); Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who 
"Blows the WhiStle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public 
Policy, 1977 Wxs. L. REv. 777. 
33 See Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 
( 1959) (termination for refusal to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by 
statute); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 
(1973) (termination for exercise of statutory right to file workman's compensation 
claim); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 ( 1976) 
(workmen's compensation law); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) 
(termination for having accepted jury duty); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, 255 
Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 ( 1978) (jury duty); Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 
533 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (workmen's compensation law). 
34 Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 ( 1974). 
35 Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. 
36 For further discussion of the Monge case, see Notes, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. 
REv. 232 (1975); 7 CoM. L. REv. 758 (1975); 8 CREIGHTON L. REv. 700 (1975); 
43 FoRDHAM L. REv. 300 (1974); 8 GA. L. REv. 996 (1974); 63 KY. L.J. 513 
(1975); 6 TEx. TEcH. L. REv. 271 (1974). 
37 "In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the 
employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against 
the interests of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's 
interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two." 114 N.H. at 133, 316 
A.2d at 551. 
38 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1578-80, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. 
39 The Court no doubt recognized this when it stated: "It is clear that the 
contract itself reserved to the parties an explicit power to terminate the contract 
without cause on written notice." Id. at 1575, 364 N.E.2d at 1255. 
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a requirement of good faith. In promulgating this new rule, however, 
the Court failed to explain whether the requirement pf good faith and 
fair dealing is tantamount to a good cause standard,40 what measure 
of damages should be applied,41 or the proof requiJed to establish a 
prima facie case.42 It is unlikely that the Court will restrict the rule 
to at will terminations in which commissions are invblved, leaving the 
parameters of the rule open to further judicial "polic~making." 43 
§8.3. Employment Contracts: Employee Covenants Not to Compete. 
Two cases decided by the appellate courts during I the Survey year 
provide an excellent review of the standards to be applied in assessing 
whether a noncompetition covenant will be enforced I against a former 
employee. In both cases, the courts found that the employer-plaintiff 
had failed to show sufficient legitimate business intertsts to justify en-
forcement of the noncompetition covenants. 
40 See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 ST4N. L. REv. 335, 368 
( 1974): ("Using dismissal for cause as a standard is equivblent to implying a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the contract of employment . . . ."); 
But see Note, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 232, 237 (1975) ~comparing standard 
of good faith to standard of good cause ) . 
41 The Court pointed out in a footnote that Fortune's d~mages were set by 
stipulation of the parties, and thus it declined to consider whether other measures 
of damages might be justified. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1575 n.7, 364 N.E.2d at 
1255 n.7. The Court also left open the question of whether! a tort action, with 
possible punitive damages, might lie. Id. Most of the cases that have found an 
exception to the common law rule are based on tort law. See Montalvo v. Zamora, 
7 Cal. App.3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 ( 1970); Petermann v. '!leamsters Local 396, 
174 Cal. App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 ( 1959); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 
260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Nees v. Hicks, 272 Orl 210, 536 P.2d 512 
(1975); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). 
The Fortune Court observed that this theory has generally beep utilized to protect 
a public policy. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1576 n.8, 364 N.E.2d at 1256 n.8. The 
commentators are not in agreement on the appropriate basis in law, contract or 
tort, for establishing an exception to the common law rule re~arding employment 
at will contracts, and at least one commentator suggests the statutory repeal of 
the common law rule. See note 31 supra. 
42 It is not clear whether the employee must prove involun~ary termination and 
that the termination was in bad faith, or whether the employer must show reason-
able grounds to avoid a determination that he acted in bad fai~h. This point may 
become academic, however, once a case reaches the jury. Se£! Blades, supra note 
.32 at 1430-31. 
43 It is interesting to note that the California courts, the pro~enitor of the public 
policy exception, see note 33 supra, have been reluctant to broaden the public 
policy exception based on statutory exception. See, e.g., Mallard v. Boring, 182 
Cal. App.2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 ( 1960), in which the empl4yee was discharged 
because she informed the local court she would be available for jury service. This 
interference with the functioning of the legal system was des<yribed by the court 
as "reprehensible" and "short-sighted," but the court refused ~o rule for the em-
ployee in the absence of prior legislation. Id. at 394,. 6 Cal. Rptr. at 174. 
I 8
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The first case, New England Canteen Service, Inc. v. Ashley,1 con-
cerned suits by an employer to restrain two former employees 2 from 
engaging in a competitive food service business within fifty miles of 
the employer's location for a period of eighteen months. This was 
pursuant to a noncompetition covenant in written agreements entered 
into between New England Canteen and the two employees.3 In addi-
tion to the noncompetition covenant, the agreements provided for the 
purchase by each employee of food items such as sandwiches and 
coffee from the employer. The employee would then sell these food 
items from a truck bearing the employer's insignia at prices set by the 
employer at locations either furnished or approved by the employer. 
Although not a term of the written agreement, the employees paid 
$150 a month to the employer as a "franchise fee." After more than 
two years, the two truck drivers terminated their agreements but 
continued selling good items, purchased from alternative sources, 
at most of the same stops at which they sold under the agreement 
with the plaintiff.4 
The trial judge dismissed the employer's complaints, finding: 1) no 
trade secrets or business methods unique to the plaintiff employer were 
involved, 2) whatever goodwill existed was generated by the truck 
drivers, 3) the employer violated the agreements by failing to furnish 
the contractually required management and supervisory assistance and 
by collecting the extra-contractual "franchise fee," and 4) the noncom-
petition covenant was too broad in both time and geographical area 
to be enforceable in equity consonant with public policy.l' 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court. In so doing the Court stated the general rule, enunciated 
in 1974 in Marine Contractors Co. v. Hurley,6 that employee covenants 
§8.3. 1 372 Mass. 671, 363 N.E.2d 526 (1977). 
2 The employer instituted two lawsuits, one against each employee. The 
Supreme Judicial Court issued a single opinion treating the cases as companion 
cases. Id., 363 N.E.2d. at 527. 
a Although it is not clear that the written agreement was an "employment 
contract," the Court treated it as one. Consequently, the language of "employer-
employee" is used herein. The full text of the noncompetition covenant, which 
also prohibits the disclosure of the employer's business methods or business secrets, 
appears in 372 Mass. at 672-73 n.2, 363 N.E.2d at 527 n.2. 
4 372 Mass. at 672-73, 363 N.E.2d at 527-28. 
G Id. at 673, 363 N.E.2d at 528. The trial judge also dismissed the counter-
claims of the defendants except for so much of such claims as entitled the de-
fendants to return of the extra-contractual "franchise fees." The Court ordered 
an accounting for these fees, and referred the accounting to a master. Id. at 
671-72, 363 N.E.2d at 527. 
6 365 Mass. 280, 310 N.E.2cl 915 ( 1974). This rule was established and 
refined in a trilogy of cases in 1974, including Marine Contractors; All Stainless, 
Inc. v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773, 308 N.E.2d 481 (1974); and National Hearing Aid 
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not to compete generally are enforceable only to the extent that they 
are necessary to protect the legitimate business interests of the em-
ployer.7 The Court in Nett: England Canteen classified the interests 
which may be protected into three generic categories: trade secrets,8 
confidential data,9 and goodwill.10 The Court furtherl stated that as a 
threshold requirement for injunctive relief, the burded of persuasion is 
on the plaintiff to show the existence of one or more ol these interests.11 
The Court agreed with the trial court that the case at b r did not involve 
trade secrets or confidential data. 12 On the central iss e of whether the 
employer had a goodwill interest that could be harmed, the Court, apply-
ing the "clearly en·oneous" standard of review to the trial judge's find-
ings,13 stated that the record justified the conclusion that the former 
employees did not interfere with any goodwill interest legally attribut-
able to the plaintif£.14 As noted above, the trial cour had found that 
any goodwill that may have been generated was du to the work of 
the defendantsY' 
In the second case, Folsom Funeral Service, Inc. J, Rodgers,1° the 
Appeals Court reversed the trial court's judgment eJjoining a former 
Centers, Inc. v. Avers, 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 547, 311 N.E.2d 573. For 
a discussion of these cases, see Pasternak, Contracts, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MAss LAW 
§ 7.1, at 136. 
7 372 Mass. at 673-74, 363 N.E.2d at 528 (quoting Marine Contractors, 365 
Mass. at 287, 310 N.E.2d at 920). 
s 372 Mass. at 674, 363 N.E.2d at 528, citing Analogic C rp. v. Data Trans-
lation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 358 N.E.2d 804 (1976); All Stai less, Inc. v. Colby, 
364 Mass. 773, 308 N.E.2d 481 ( 1974). 
9 372 Mass. at 674, 363 N.E.2d at 528, citing Novelty ias Binding Co. v. 
Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714, 175 N.E.2d 374 (1961); Walker al & Ice Co. v. 
Westerman, 263 Mass. 235, 160 N.E. 801 (1928). 
10 372 Mass. at 674, 363 N.E.2d at 628, citing New England Tree Expert Co. v. 
Russell, 306 Mass. 504, 28 N.E.2d 997 (1940); Sherman v. Pf fferkorn, 241 Mass. 
468, 135 N.E. 568 (1922). 
11 372 Mass. at 675, 363 N.E.2d at 529. The Court also pointed out that 
even if the threshold requirement is met, equitable factors may militate against 
enforcement. Id. at 674, 363 N.E.2d at 528, citing Economy Grocery Store Corp. 
v. McMenamy, 290 Mass. 549, 195 N.E. 747 ( 1935). One such factor would be 
a material breach of the contract by the plaintiff. 372 Mass. at 676, 363 N.E.2d 
d 9~ ' 
12 372 Mass. at 674, 363 N.E.2d at 528. i 
13 See Mass. R. Civ. P. 52( a). 1' 
14 372 Mass. at 675-76, 363 N.E.2d at 529. ·New England anteen also claimed 
that the trial court erred in ruling a) that the agreements were too broad in terms 
of time and area, b) that· the employer breached the agree ents by failing to 
provide supervisory assistance, and c) by collecting the extra-c ntractual "franchise 
fee." See text at note 5 supra. The Court did not find it necessary to address 
these issues in light of its disposition, but it did note that even if New England 
Canteen did have a business interest subject to protection, a finding of material 
breach of the agreement by the employer would serve as a basis for denial of 
injunctive relief. Id. 
Hi See text at note 5 supra. 
16 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 90, 372 N.E.2d 532 (rescript opinion). 
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employee from engaging in the undertaking business within a radius of 
ten miles from each of the four funeral homes operated by the plaintiff-
employer for a period of four years. Following the analytical structure 
of New England Canteen, the court reviewed the master's findings to 
determine for itself whether the plaintiff had satisfied its burden of 
persuasion as to the existence of legally protectible goodwill interests.17 
It concluded that the master's findings were not adequate to support a 
finding that the employer possessed goodwill of a type likely to be 
adversely affected.18 The court stressed in this regard the absence of 
a finding indicating "a significant number of plaintiff's customers make 
'repeat' purchases of undertaking services," that plaintiff derived busi-
ness from referral sources with whom the defendant had been in con-
tact, or that the defendant had solicited former or present customers 
of the plaintiff.19 Accordingly, the court determined that Rodgers' 
covenant not to compete was wholly unenforceable, and it reversed the 
judgment below and dismissed the action.20 
The rule in Massachusetts applicable to employee covenants not to 
compete consistently has been: "A covenant restraining trade or com-
petition, inserted in a contract for personal service, is not in itself in-
valid if the interest to be protected is consonant with public policy 
and if the restraint is limited reasonably in time and space." 21 Appli-
cation of this rule, however, had been uneven 22 until the Supreme 
Judicial Court in 1974 expressly approved limitations on legitimately 
protectable employer interests. 23 In New England Canteen, the Court 
has reinforced this limitation and has described three generic catego-
ries of interest which may be protected-trade secrets, confidential 
data, and goodwill.24 Unfortunately, however, the Court's opinion in 
17 The plaintiff conceded that it possessed no trade secret or confidential data 
entitled to protection. Id. at 90, 372 N.E.2d at 533. Thus, as in New England 
Canteen, the only issue was the existence of a goodwill interest likely to be injured 
by the former employee's competition. 
18 Id. 
19 Id .. 
20 !d. at 91, 372 N.E.2d at 534. 
21 See Blackwell v. E.M. Helides, Jr., Inc., 368 Mass. 225, 228, 331 N.E.2d 
54, 56 ( 1975) (quoting Becker College v. Gross, 281 Mass. 355, 358, 183 N.E. 765, 
766 (1933)). See also Saltman v. Smith, 313 Mass. 135, 46 N.E.2d 550 (1943). 
22 The Court has tacitly acknowledged this observation. See All Stainless, Inc. 
v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773, 780-81 & n.2, 308 N.E.2d 481, 486-87 & n.2 ( 1974). One 
commentator describes the earlier decisions as "difficult to reconcile," Pasternak, 
Contracts, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw §7.1, at 136. Another commentator de-
scribes Massachusetts law as "a confusing body of precedent," and explains the 
trend culminating in the 1974 trilogy as "Corbinization," Comment, Recent De-
velopments Concerning Employee Covenants Not to Compete: A Quiet "Corbiniza-
tion" of Massachusetts Law, 12 NEw ENG. L. REv. 647 ( 1977). 
23 See text at notes 6-7 supra. 
24 See text and notes 8-10 supra. An employ<er's interests in trade secrets and 
confidential data may be protectable even absent a written agreement. See § 8.4 
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New England Canteen provides little guidance as to the factors that 
should be demonstrated to evidence a protectible goodwill interest, 
although the subsequent opinion by the Appeals Court in Folsom 
Funeral Service does suggest some relevant factors. 2ul Indeed, it ap-
pears that in New England Canteen goodwill may ha~e been present, 
but had not been proven by the plaintiff. 26 i 
An employer is entitled to protection from unfair inj6ry at the hands 
of a former employee that is threatened by some competitive advantage 
acquired by the employee in the course of employment. The employer 
is not, however, entitled to protection against mere ordinary competi-
tion by the employee's acquisition of skills in and general knowledge 
of the employer's trade.27 For the practitioner drafting or seeking to 
enforce such a protective covenant, the following factors should be 
considered in advising an employer as to the enforcekbility of such a 
covenant and in determining the elements of proof o!l risk of injury to 
the employer's "goodwill" interest should litigation 9e necessary: 1) 
frequency of contacts with the employer's customers,] particularly the 
likelihood of repeat sales to a customer or the likelipood of referrals 
of other customers by those with whom the employee comes in contact;28 
infra. Consequently, it is anticipated that subsequent appellate decisions will 
focus largely on the scope of the employer's "goodwill" interest. 
25 See text at note 19 supra. 
26 The trial court found that whatever goodwill existed was generated by the 
defendants. See 372 Mass. at 673, 363 N.E.2d at 528. Ho~ver, it is just such 
a finding that constitutes justification for the restriction on c mpetition. This is 
the clear import of the Court's recent decision of All Stain ess, Inc. v. Colby, 
3G4 "lass. 773, 308 N.E.2d 481 (1974). In All Stainless, t e employee was a 
route salesman with primary customer contact. The Court he! that the employer 
was entitled to protect its goodwill by restraining the former mployee from sales 
activity in his former sales territory. The Court stated: 
Any restraint must be consistent with the protection of the good will of the 
employer. The former employee must be in a position where he can harm 
that good will, perhaps (as here) because the former employee's close as-
sociation with the employer's customers may cause those customers to as-
sociate the former employee, and not the employer, with products of the 
type sold to the customer through the efforts of the former employee. 
Id. at 779-80, 308 N.E.2d at 486. As Corbin puts its: "S ch a justification is 
commonly thought to exist if a part of the employee's compen ated service consists 
in the creation of the good will of customers and clients, a go d will that is likely 
to follow the person of the employee himself." 6A A. CoRBIN, CoNTRACTs § 1394, 
at 100 (1962). 
27 See New England Canteen, 372 Mass. at 626, 363 N.E.2 at 529; All Stain-
less, 364 Mass. at 779-80, 308 N.E.2d at 486; Blake, Emplo ee Agreements Not 
to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1960) [hereinafter cite as Blake]. For a 
discussion of the validity of a restriction based on the "uniqueness" of the em-
ployee's services, see Kniffin, Employee Noncompetition Covenants: The Perils 
of Performing Unique Services, 10 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 25 ( 1978). 
28 See Blake, supra note 27, at 659-60. See also All Stainless, 364 Mass. at 
779-80, 308 N.E.2d at 486; National Hearing Aid Centers, Inc. v. Avers, 2 Mass. 
App. 285, 291-92, 311 N.E.2d 573, 577-78 (1974). 
12
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1978 [1978], Art. 11
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1978/iss1/11
§8.4 CONTRACTS AND CO~IMERCIAL LAW 163 
2) location of the employee's contacts with customers, whether at the 
employer's place of business or at the customer's location;2!l 3) the 
nature of the contact between the employee and the customer, such 
as a special expertise;ao and 4) the solicitation of employer's customers 
by the former employee.31 
§8.4. Employee's Misappropriation of Employer's Trade Secrets: 
Remedies. In a corollary to the "unfair competition" represented by the 
noncompetition covenant cases discussed above,1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court was also called upon during the Survey year to determine the 
protection to be accorded an employer against the use of the employer's 
"trade secret." The Comt's opinion in Eastern Marble Products Corp. 
v. Roman Marble, Inc. 2 is instructive on what constih1tes a trade secret, 
the measure of protection required to maintain trade secret status, and 
the basis of the employee's obligation. 
Eastern Marble, the plaintiff, was engaged in the manufacture of 
simulated marble sinks according to a formula and process furnished 
by Marble-Crete Products, Inc. ("Marble-Crete") pursuant to a fran-
' chise agreement with that company. Eastern Marble and Marble-Crete, 
following several months of experimentation, had developed a method 
of manufacturing a two-tone one-piece molded sink, with the top being 
of one color and the bowl of another. They were the only two com-
panies to manufacture such sinks among the approximately one hun-
dred manufacturers of cultured marble in the United States.3 Eastern 
Marble instructed its employees to keep the public out of the manu-
facturing area, where various formulae and notes regarding production 
were posted. The company also required its manufacturing employees 
to sign nondisclosure and noncompetition agreements concerning the 
company's manufacturing processes.4 
The individual defendants were two former employees of Eastern 
Marble. One of them, Irving Cann, had been employed as a factory 
29 See Blake, supra note 27, at 660. 
30 See id. at 661. See also Middlesex Neurological Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 3 
Mass. App. 126, 324 N.E.2d 911 ( 1975). 
31 Compare Richmond Bros. v. Westinghouse Bdcst. Co., 357 Mass. 106, 256 
N.E.2d 304 (1970 ), with New England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 
504, 28 N.E.2d 997 ( 1940). 
§8.4. 1 See § 8.3 supra. 
2 372 Mass. 835, 364 N.E.2d 799 (1977). 
3 Id. at 836-37, 364 N.E.2d at 800-01. 
4 The agreements provided that the employees had learned the methods, pro-
cedures, and formulae of Eastern Marble and Marble-Crete for "the sole purpose 
of assisting in manufacturing said products," that they would not disclose these 
methods to anyone, and that they would "not . . . enter any business of this 
nature" except as a franchisee. 372 Mass. at 837, 364 N.E.2d at 801. 
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representative. He did not sign the nondisclosure-noncompetition 
agreement,5 perhaps because he was not a manufacturing employee. 
The other individual defendant, Robert McEachern~was still a minor 
when hired by Eastern Marble.6 McEachern did si the noncompeti-
tion-nondisclosure agreement at the commencement o his employment.7 
Cann, while still employed by Eastern Marble, inrorporated Roman 
Marble, Inc. ("Roman Marble") for the purpose of l(nanufacturing cul-
tured marble sinks. He then quit Eastern Marbl~ and hired Mc-
Eachern, who had left Eastern Marble months earlier, and another to 
come and work for Roman Marble.8 Cann independently learned from 
a California concern how to make cultured marble. Although Cann 
did not know Eastern Marble's formulae and had not witnessed the 
manufacturing process, McEachern was able to provide the knowledge 
required to make two-tone one-piece cultured marble sinks. Roman 
Marble then began to produce these sinks for sale.~ 
Eastern Marble then brought a bill in equity seek~ng to enjoin Cann 
and McEachern from using or disclosing Eastern Marble's trade secrets 
involving the manufacture of cultured marble sinks!. The trial judge 
ruled that while the process of manufacturing cultured marble sinks 
was not a trade secret, the process of manufacturing two-tone one-piece 
sinks was a trade secret.10 The judge enjoined McEachern from dis-
closing or making use of Eastern Marble's trade secrets. This relief 
was based on. the terms of McEachern's nondisclosure-noncompetition 
agreement.U The judge also permanently enjoined Cann from manu-
facturing the two-toned product. This relief was btsed on the court's 
finding that Cann "wrongfully obtained the process for the manufac-
ture of" a two-tone cultured marble top and bowJ.l 
On appeal,13 Cann 14 argued: 1) that the manu£ ch1re of two-tone 
cultured marble sinks did not involve a trade secret, as the process of 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 841, 364 N.E.2d at 803. McEachern was ninete~n when he was hired 
by Eastern Marble in 1970 and, consequently, was over tw nty-one when he left 
the company in April 1973. The hiring was before the age of contractual ca-
pacity in Massachusetts was lowered to eighteen by Acts o 1973, c. 925, § 74, 
adding G.L. c. 231, § 850. 
7 372 Mass. at 837, 364 N.E.2d at 801. I 
8 Id. at 837-38, 364 N.E.2d at 801. I 
9 Id. at 838, 364 N.E.2d at 801. I 
1o Id. at 836, 364 N.E.2d at 800. I 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 The Supreme Judicial Court ordered the case transferred pursuant to G.L. 
c. 211A, § 10(A). 
14 McEachern did not appeal from the final decree. 372 Mass. at 836, 364 
N .E.2d at 800. 
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manufacturing two-tone sinks, which the trial court found was not a 
trade secret, cannot be distinguished from that used to make one-color 
sinks. As a corollary to this argument, he contended that an injunction 
against the manufacture of an end product-two-tone cultured marble 
products-is too broad;15 2) that Eastern Marble did not treat the 
process of manufacture as a secret; 16 and 3) that Cann did not unlaw-
fully obtain information from McEachern, as that would have required 
the breach of a contract which was avoidable due to McEachern's 
infancy 17 and which Cann claimed was in fact disaffirmed by the 
employee.18 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected Cann's first argument, referring 
to the comprehensive definition of trade secret adopted by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts 19 and prior Massachusetts cases establishing 
that manufacturing processes are entitled to protection as trade secrets.20 
Although the technical distinction between the process of manufactur-
ing two-tone and one-tone sinks may have been nebulous, the .Court 
noted that the two-tone product could not have been produced by Cann 
without the special knowledge that McEachern gained from Eastern 
Marble.21 '(he injunction therefore simply reflected the trial court's 
judgment that the product and the process are inextricably connected.22 
With respect to Cann's second contention that Eastern Marble did 
not treat the process of manufacture as a trade secret, the Court found 
that by requiring a signed nondisclosure agreement by all manufac-
15 Id. at 838, 364 N.E.2d at 801. 
16 Id. at 840, 364 N.E.2d at 802. 
17 See note 6 supra. 
18 372 Mass. at 840-41, 364 N.E.2d at 803. 
19 Id. at 838-39, 364 N.E.2d at 801. The position of the RESTATEMENT is: 
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of 
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an op-
portunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use 
it. It may be . . . a process of manufacturing. . . . A trade secret is a 
process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business. Gener-
ally it relates to the production of goods, as, for example, a machine or formula 
for the production of an article. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b. ( 1939). The RESTATEMENT defini-
tion is the definition most widely followed by the courts. See R. MrLGRIM, TRADE 
SECRETS § 2.01 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MrLGRIM]; Harding, Trade Secrets 
and the Mobile Employee, 22 Bus. LAw. 395, 398 ( 1967). 
20 372 Mass. at 839, 364 N.E.2d at 802, citing Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Cramp-
ton, 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E.2d 921 ( 1972); J.T. HealY' & Son v. James A. Murphy 
& Son, 357 Mass. 728, 260 N.E.2d 723 ( 1970); Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 
76, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946); Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condensor 
Co., 239 Mass. 158, 131 N.E. 307 (1921). 
21 372 Mass. at 839-40, 364 N.E.2d at 802. 
22 Id. at 839-40, 364 N.E.2d at 802. See MrLGRIM, supra note 19, at § 708-
(l)(b). 
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turing employees and by separating the public from ~he manufacturing 
area, Eastern Marble took sufficient measures to preshve the necessary 
secrecy.23 I 
The most significant holding of the Court, howeve~, was its response 
to Cmm's final argument that the information was nof obtained unlaw-
fully because McEachern had disaffirmed a voidable1 contract, thereby 
making a breach impossible. In this regard, Cann I argued that Mc-
Eachern disaffirmed the agreement when he joined 1man Marble and 
that this was his first opportunity to do so.24 The Court disagreed, 
indicating that the trial court could have found a . atification of the 
contract, but did not consider it necessary to reach1 this issue.25 In-
stead, the Court emphasized that the employee's du y not to disclose 
confidential information arises from "an implied con ract, growing out 
of the nature of the employer-employee relation." 26 The Court went 
on to state: "This duty does not necessarily turn o the existence of 
a legally enforceable contract. The judge was ther ore warranted in 
finding that Cann unlawfully obtained trade secre s through hiring 
McEachern, regardless of the possible question of. McEachern's mi-
nority." 27 I 
I 
Finally, the Court addressed itself to the remedy afforded by the 
trial court, of permanently enjoining Cann from manufacturing two-
tone one-piece cultured marble tops and bowls.28 T e Court observed 
that the remedy of a permanent injunction may no 1 nger be appropri-
ate in light of the passage of time since the origin 1 decree and the 
Court's intervening decision in Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc.29 
In Analogic the Court stated that one of the fact rs the trial court 
should consider when establishing the scope and du ation of a "trade 
secrets" injunction is the amount of time it would ta e competitors "to 
' 
23 372 Mass. at 840, 364 N.E.2d at 802. See J.T. Healy ~ Son, Inc. v. James 
A. Murphy & Son, Inc. 357 Mass. 728, 738, 260 N.E.2d f23, 730-31 (1970), 
where the Court stated that the plaintiff, in order to preserfe a trade secret for 
his exclusive use, "must not fail to take all proper and reas nable steps to keep 
it secret .... [O]ne who claims that he has a trade secret must exercise eternal 
vigilance." 
24 372 Mass. at 841, 364 N.E.2d at 803. I 
~u 1 
26 Id. at 841, 364 N.E.2d at 803 (quoting Jet Spray Cool r, Inc. v. Crampton, 
361 Mass. 835, 839, 282 N.E.2d 921, 924 ( 1972) ). The Co rt also quoted New 
England Overall Co. v. Wolfmann, 343 Mass. 69, 75, 176 N .. 2d 193, 198 (1961) 
and cited RESTATEMENT ( SEcOJ.;D) OF AGENCY § 396 ( 1958 ; Annot., 30 A.L.R. 
3d 631 ( 1970); Comment Developments in the Law--C mpetitive Torts, 77 
HARV. L. REv. 888, 948-49 (1964). See 372 Mass. at 841-4 , 364 N.E.2d at 803. 
27 372 Mass. at 842, 364 N.E.2d at 803. 
28 See text at note 12 supra. 
29 372 Mass. at 842-43, 364 N.E.2d at 803-04, citing Ana ogic, 371 Mass. 643, 
358 N.E.2d 804 (1976). 
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reverse engineer the plaintiff's device without improper use of trade 
secrets." :~o The Eastern Marble Court therefore reversed the final 
decree to pmmit a hearing on the duration of any new injunction which 
may be entered.31 
As Eastern Marble shows, the employee, as well as the employer,32 
has certain implied obligations arising out of the employer-employee 
relationship. It is also interesting to note that nondisclosure covenants, 
unlike noncompetition covenants, are generally upheld and enforced 
by the courts.33 
§8.5. Illegality: Recovery in Quantum Meruit. In Harness Tracks 
Security, Inc. v. Bay State Racetcay, Inc. 1 the Supreme Judicial Comt 
considered the question of when a contracting party's illegal conduct 
will bar recovery under the contract or in quantum meruit off the 
contract. 
The plaintiff, a New York corporation, was hired by defendant, a 
Massachusetts corporation engaged in operating a harness raceway, to 
render investigative, informational, preventive and supervisory services 
at its Foxboro race track. In turn, the defendant agreed to pay the 
plaintiff a fee, under a formula prescribed in the written contract be-
tween the parties. The contract also recited that plaintiff was licensed 
in both New York and Massachusetts to engage in the business of 
private investigation.~ In fact, however, plaintiff was licensed only in 
New York; it had neither sought nor procured the required Massachu-
setts license. 3 The contract, signed on July 29, 1971, was to extend 
through December 31, 1975, but was terminable at the end of a year 
upon one year's prior written notice.4 
The plaintiff satisfactorily performed the required services until 
March 12, 1973, furnishing reports to the defendant about certain in-
dividuals and practices at harness racing tracks in various parts of the 
30 371 Mass. at 657-58, 358 N.E.2d at 807-08. The Analogic Court went on to 
observe that defendants who wilfully seek to profit by improper use of trade 
secrets need not he placed in as good a position as honest competitors of the 
plaintiff. Where a defendant is saved substantial expense by avoiding the normal 
invention and duplication costs, the comt may be entitled to condition the ex-
piration of the injunction on the payment of an appropriate sum to the plaintiff. 
Id. at 649, 358 N.E.2d at 808. 
31 372 Mass. at 843, 364 N .E.2d at 804. See Annot., 38 A.L.R. 3d 572 ( 1971). 
32 See § 8.2 supra. 
33 See MILGRIM, supra note 19. 
§8.5. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 309, 373 N.E.2d 353. 
2 Id. at 310, 373 N.E.2d at 354-55. 
3 Id. at 310, 311, 373 N.E.2d at 354, 355. See G.L. c. 147, §§ 22-30, which 
regulates private detective services in the Commonwealth. 
4 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 311, 373 N.E.2d at 355. 
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country. During this period, none of plaintiff's emplo ees was licensed 
as a private detective under Massachusetts law. H wever, one em-
ployee was also an officer of a duly licensed Massach setts corporation 
with whom plaintiff had a "vague arrangement" whereby that com-
pany's employees performed services for plaintiff at defendant's race 
track.r; Nothing in the record indicated that the defe dants knew that 
plaintiff was unlicensed in Massachusetts or knew t at employees of 
any other company were rendering services on behalf f plaintiff when 
the defendant terminated the contract on March 1 , 1973, effective 
March 31, 1973.6 
The plaintiff brought suit in superior court seeking payment for its 
services. In a jury-waived trial, wherein the issue f illegality was 
"the only issue on liability," the trial court denied recovery on the 
basis that plaintiff was not licensed as a private detect ve in Massachu-
setts.7 On plaintiff's appeal, the Appeals Court, being "equally divided 
concerning the plaintiff's right to recover for its serv'ces in quantum 
meruit, in the circumstances of this case," reported the case to the 
Supreme Judicial Court.8 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the superior 
court.0 However, the Court agreed with the trial jud e that the plain-
tiff had engaged in the private detective business · Massachusetts 
without a license.10 The Court found that the plai tiff did not fall 
within any of the statutory exceptions to the licensi g requirements: 
plaintiff's services were broader than those limited s rvices excepted, 
and since plaintiff had never formally designated the licensed Massa-
chusetts company its representative, the exception for a licensed rep-
resentative was inapplicable.11 
The Court applied the standards set forth in the 197 Town Planning 
& Engineering Associates v. Amesbury Specialty Co.12 ecision to deter-
mine whether recovery of compensation should be inhi ited because of 
the plaintiff's illegality. In Town Planning, the Cou established a 
li Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 310, 373 N.E.2d at 354. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 310, 315, 373 N.E.2d at 354, 357. 
10 Id. G.L. c. 147, § 23 provides in relevant part: "No rson shall engage 
in . . . private detective business or the business of wat , guard or patrol 
agency . . . unless licensed for such purposes as provided in s ction twenty-five." 
Violation is punishable by a fine of $1,000 or imprisonment or not more than 
one year, or both. The plaintiff admitted that these servi s were performed 
under the contract. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 311, 373 N.E.2d t 355. 
11 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 312-13, 373 N.E.2d at 355-56. See G.L. c. 147, 
§ 23, cl. 7 & 9. 
12 369 Mass. 737, 342 N.E.2d 706 ( 1976). 
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framework of weighing and balancing all of the circumstances in deter-
mining whether a yiolation of statute or other illegality should preclude 
the plaintiff from recovery under the contract.13 The Harness Tracks 
Security Court concluded: "As in the Town Planning case, we think 
the vector of considerations here points in the plaintiff's favor." 14 The 
Court noted that the business was carried on through a licensed com-
pany and its employees, so, except for the plaintiff, a corporate entity, 
there was no "showing of disregard of the 'distinct legislative concern 
with the honesty of one engaged in the business of private detective.'" 15 
Moreover, the actual violations, failure to pay the license fee and post 
a bond, "could have been avoided by the expedient" of appointing the 
licensed Massachusetts company that actually performed the services 
as plaintiff's "official representative." 16 The Court ruled that plaintiff 
was entitled to recover on the contract for services performed up to 
March 31, 1973, the date of termination; it would be a "sufficient sanc-
tion" to disallow recovery for damages resulting from Bay State Race-
way's breach of the executory portion of the contractP 
Having determined that recovery was not barred by illegality, the 
Court then turned to the question of whether the plaintiff's failure to 
obtain the required Massachusetts license was a failure to perform a 
material condition of the contract.18 The Court found that this breach 
of contract was sufficiently material to justify the defendant in can-
celling the contract, since the defendant might be liable for the torts 
of unlicensed personnel.19 However, the breach was not so material 
13 The Court stated in Town Planning: 
To find a proper answer, all the circumstances are to be considered and 
evaluated: what was the nature of the subject matter of the contract; what 
was the extent of the illegal behavior; was that behavior a material or only 
an incidental part of the performance of the contract . . . ; what was the 
strength of the public policy underlying the prohibition; how far would 
effectuation of the public policy be defeated by denial of an added sanction; 
how serious or deserved would be the forfeiture suffered by the plaintiff, 
how gross or undeserved the defendant's windfall. 
Id. at 745, 342 N.E.2d at 711 (1976). 
H 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 314, 373 N.E.2d at 356. 
15 I d. at 313, 373 N .E.2d at 356 (quoting Bond v. Commissioner of Pub. 
Safety, 1 Mass. App. 536, 540, 303 N.E.2d 127, 130 (1973) ). 
16 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 313, 373 N.E.2d at 356. 
17 Id. at 314, 373 N.K2cl at 356, viting RFSTAP''\fENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS 
§ 323(b) & Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977). 
18 Although this question may not have been properly before the Court, as it 
recognized, since the trial judge's statement indicated that failure of performance 
was not asserted at trial, its resolution would not affect the outcome of the case. 
Id. at 314-15, 373 N.E.2d at 356. 
19 Id. at 315, 373 N.E.2d at 356, citing Cowan v. Eastern Racing Ass'n, 330 
Mass. 135, 142-45, 111 N.E.2d 752, 756-57 (1953); Hartigan v. Eastern Racing 
Ass'n, 311 Mass. 368, 370-71, 41 N.E.2d 28, 29-30 (1942). Further, cancellation 
for any other reason does not impair the justification. See New England Structures, 
Inc. v. Loranger, 354 Mass. 62, 65-67, 234 N.E.2d 888, 891-92 (1968). See also 
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that defendant should receive a gift of plaintifFs Jervices. Conse-
quently, the Court, analogizing the standards applied o the defense of 
illegality to failure of performance, ruled that the plai iff could recover 
for services actually rendered.20 Accordingly, the Co rt remanded the 
case to the superior court for a determination of pla~ntiff's damages.21 
By its decision in this case, then, the Court has ~emoved any un-
certainty as to the availability of recovery in quant1m meruit where 
illegality is asserted as a defense to a contract claim. In Town Plan-
ning & Engineering Associates, wherein the Court s t forth the stan-
dards to be applied where illegality is asserted as a d fense, the Court, 
while holding that the plaintiff in that case could retover on the ex-
press contract, noted that some cases may call for a sanction limiting 
recovery only "to a quantum meruit less than any ontract price." 22 
The holding in Harness Tracks Security, Inc. should ispel any uncer-
tainty as to the availability of this remedy.23 : 
§8.6. Investment Securities: Debentures: Setoff ~ights. In E.H. 
Hinds, Inc. v. Coolidge Bank & Trust Co.,l a case co1ceming Article 8 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Appeals Court held that deben-
tures qualify as investment securities under the Code and are not sub-
ject to setoff rights contained in separate instrument . 
In 1970 Industrial Bank and Trust Company ( "In~ustrial"), due to 
its deteriorating financial condition, decided to incre se its capital by 
issuing $380,000 worth of debentures for sale to ts directors and 
others.~ At that time, some of the directors were pe sonally indebted 
to Industrial on promissory notes which included a provision giving 
Industrial the right to set off and apply against the di ectors' respective 
liabilities to it any sums due at any time from Industr' al.3 These same 
directors, acting through a common intermediary, b rrowed from the 
plaintiffs the amounts necessary to purchase the debe tures.4 
The debentures were issued in two classes, one class being convertible 
into capital stock of Industrial Bank on specified ter s and the other 
class being without a conversion privilege.5 . The rincipal of both 
classes was payable in five years, with quarterly inter st to be paid to 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 262 & Comment 
8, 1973), cited by the Harness Tracks Security Court. 
2o 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 315, 373 N.E.2d at 357. 
21 Id. 
(Tent. Draft No. 
22 369 Mass. at 747, 342 N.E.2d at 712. f 
23 Note that the division in the Appeals Court reflected orne uncertainty in 
the matter. See text at note 8 supra. 
§8.6. 1 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 15, 372 N.E.2d 259.1 
2 Id. at 16, 372 N.E.2d at 260. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 17-18, 372 N.E.2d at 261. 
5 Id. at 17, 372 N.E.2d at 260. 
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the order of the director named on each debenture. Each debenture 
also bore a form that could be used for transferring it on the books of 
IndustrialY The convertible debentures recited that the conversion 
terms had been approved by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion ("FDIC") and that any other retirement would require FDIC 
prior written consent, which had not been requested or obtained.7 The 
nonconvertible debentures also recited that any retirement required 
the prior written consent of the FDIC, which also had not been re-
quested or obtained.8 Each debenture expressly stated that principal 
and interest would remain obligations of Industrial until fully paid, and 
that principal and interest would become due and payable on the de-
mand of the holder if any default in interest payment continued for 
thirty days.n None of the debentures contained any reference to the 
right of setoff contained in the notes of the directors.10 The debentures 
were delivered to the plaintiffs with a form containing an indorsement 
in blank executed by the particular director named and that director's 
promissory note to the order of the particular plaintiff for the amount 
advanced for the purchase of the debenture.U 
Industrial defaulted on the debentures approximately four months 
after their issue, and subsequently was merged with and into the de-
fendant Coolidge Bank, which assumed liability for all $380,000 of 
the debentures issued. 1 ~ The former directors of Industrial defaulted 
on their notes to plaintiffs, who then made demand on Coolidge for 
payment of debentures. Coolidge refused payment, claiming a right 
of setoff in the amount still owed l)\· the former directors of Industrial 
on their promissory notesP The plaintiffs then brought an action 
against Coolidge in superior court, where Coolidge raised the right of 
setoff by way of answer and counterclaim.14 The superior court re-
jected the defendant's claim and found for the plaintiffs, based on its 
rulings that the debentures were investment securities and that plain-
tiffs were bona fide purchasers.15 
On appeal, the defendant argued first that the debentures were not 
investment securities as that term is defined in Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 16 but were instead nonnegotiable chases in action 
G I d. at 16-17, 372 N .E.2d at 260-61. 
7 Id. at 17, 372 N.E.2d at 260. 
s Id., 372 N.E.2d at 261. 
9 Id. at 16-17, 372 N.E.2d at 260. 
1o Id. at 17, 372 N.E.2d at 261. 
11 Id. at 17-18, 372 N.E.2d at 261. 
12 I d. at 18, 372 N .E.2d at 261. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 18-19, 372 N.E.2d at 261. 
15 Id. at 19, 372 N.E.2d at 261. 
1G See G.L. c. 106, § 8-102(l)(a). 
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which had been assigned to the plaintiffs in writing subject to the 
issuer's preexisting setoff right against the directors.17 1 The defendant 
also argued that the plaintiffs were not "bona fide p~uchasers" within 
the meaning of Article 8 of the Code.18 i 
The Appeals Court found the only serious questio 1 to be whether 
the debentures met the section 8-102( 1) (a) ( ii) defi ition, i.e. being 
"of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchang s or markets or 
commonly recognized in any area in which it is issu d or dealt in as 
a medium for investment." 1» The only evidence that ha been presented 
by the defendant on this point was the testimony f a stockbroker 
that he had never seen debentures with such retiremtnt restrictions 20 
and that the restrictions impaired the value of the d bentures as col-
lateral security. Therefore, the witness was of the o inion that these 
debentures would not be traded on any securities exch nge with which 
he was familiar.21 I 
The Appeals Court rejected this testimony as irrelev nt to the defini-
tion of a "security." 22 The test, stated the court, is not whether an 
instrument has ever been traded in fact on a securi ies exchange or 
market or whether it would be easy ·to trade, but hether it is an 
instrument of a type which is commonly dealt in u on securities ex-
changes or markets or commonly recognized as a m dium for invest-
ment in any area in which it is issued or dealt in.23 1 
Having ruled that the Industrial debentures were "fcurities" within 
the meaning of section 8-102( 1) (a) ( ii), the court t en resolved the 
question of the plaintiffs' right to recover on the debe tures simply on 
the basis that the plaintiffs were "holders" within the meaning of sec-
tion 1-201 ( 20), 24 finding it unnecessary and irrelev nt to reach the 
17 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 19, 372 N.E.2d at 261. I 
1 8 Id. at 21, 372 N.E.2d at 262. See G.L. c. 106, § 8-3~2, which provides: 
"A 'bona fide purchaser' is a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice 
of any adverse claim who takes delivery of a security in bea er form or of one 
in registered form issued to him or endorsed to him or in bla k." 
19 See G.L. c. 106, § 8-102(1)(a)(ii). i 
20 See text at notes 7 and 8 supra. i 
21 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 20, 372 N.E.2d at 262. _l 
22 Id. at 20-21, 372 N.E.2d at 262. The court apparent!~ had little respect 
for the value of the testimony in any event: 1 
It is obvious from a casual reading of the testimony of thi~ witness that he 
misunderstood the import of the retirement restrictions an that he totally 
ignored the unqualified obligation of Industrial to pay the d bentures at their 
maturities or upon the earlier occurrence of an event of def ult, such as the 
nonpayment of quarterly interest which occurred in this case. 
I d. at 20, 372 N .E.2d at 262. ' 
23 Id. at 21, 372 N.E.2d at 262. 
24 Id. at 22-23, 372 N.E.2d at 262-63. See G.L. c. 106, § 1-201(2), which 
defines a "holder" to include "a person who is in possession of ... an investment 
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question of whether the plaintiffs were "bona fide purchasers." 25 As 
holders of a security where the signatures are admitted, the mere pro-
duction of the instrument entitles recovery in any action on a security 
"unless the defendant establishes a defense or a defect going to the 
validity of the security." 26 There was no claim by Coolidge of any 
defect with respect to the debentures. Although the question whether 
a contractual right of setoff is a "defense" within the meaning of section 
8-105(2)(c) is apparently a novel one, the court concluded that it was 
not a "defense'' since such a right is not commonly regarded as a de-
fense in the case law,27 and because the statutory right of setoff upon 
which the defendant relied drew an express distinction between "de-
fenses" and "rights of . . . set-off." 28 A contrary interpretation, the 
court stated, would likely interfere with the freedom of transferability 
essential to the negotiability of ~investment securities.29 Accordingly, 
the issuer's setoff rights in the promissory notes would not prohibit 
recovery by the plaintiffs as holders of the securities. 
The Appeals Court modified the superior court's finding to require 
the filing of the originals of the debentures with the clerk of court for 
plaintiffs to execute on the judgment and, as modified, affirmed the 
judgment below.3o 
In E.F. Hinds the Appeals Court appropriately disregarded the ques-
tion of whether the plaintiffs were bona fide purchasers, as the 
plaintiffs were ent.itled to recovery even without the greater rights 
accorded bona fide purchasers under Article 8 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Further, the court's analysis of what constitutes a "de-
fense" within the meaning of section 8-105( 2) (c) is supported by the 
examples of "defenses" that the Code's draftsmen provided in section 
8-202.31 
security ... endorsed ... in blank." See also G.L. c. 100, § 8-308(1) and (2) 
on the indorsement requirements of certificated securities. 
25 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 23, 372 N.E.2d at 263. 
26 Id. at 22. 372 N.E.2d at 262. See G.L. c. 106, § 8-105(2)(c). Official 
Comment 3 to § 8-105 defines "any action on a security" as "any action or pro-
ceeding brought against the issuer to enforce a right or interest that is part of the 
security--e.g., to collect principal or interest. . . ." 
27 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 22-23, 372 N.E.2d at 263, citing Tilton v. 
Goodwin, 183 Mass. 236, 238, 66 N.E. 802, 803 ( 1903); Fiske v. Steele, 152 Mass. 
260, 261, 25 N.E. 291, 291 ( 1980); Barnstable Sav. Bank v. Snow, 128 Mass. 512, 
514 (1880). 
28 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 23, 372 N.E.2d at 263. See Former G.L. 
c. 231, § 5. 
29 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 23, 372 N.E.2d at 263. G.L. c. 106, 
§ 8-105 ( 1 ) declares: "Certificated securities governed by this Article are negotiable 
instruments." 
3o 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 23-24, 372 N.E.2d at 263. 
31 See G.L. c. 100, § 8-202(3) and (4). 
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